In their book Capitalism: A Conversation in Critical Theory, Nancy Fraser and Rahel Jaeggi take on a momentous task: to reconceptualize the structure of capitalism. In their words, they aim to “de-orthodoxize” our conception of capitalism (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 15). As critical theorists of the 21st century, Fraser and Jaeggi build on an abundance of academic context on noneconomic social disparities that Marx could not access. They integrate this critical-theoretical thought—on gender, race, the state, and the environment—within the structure of capitalism. What results is a multidimensional expansion of Marx's framework: a conception of capitalism as “an institutionalized social order” (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 2).

It is important to understand why distancing their thought from the orthodoxy is their goal, and for that, one needs to look at their background as critical theorists. In the introduction of the book, Fraser and Jaeggi discuss critical theory's shift away from capitalism in the mid- to late 1980s. They characterize recent scholars as viewing the economy through a “black box” model (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 4), in which the economy's negative distributive outcomes are analyzed, but its problematic composition, which explains these outcomes, is not analyzed. Fraser and Jaeggi specifically mark the publication of The Theory of Communicative Action by Jürgen Habermas as a “turning point” that “in effect [removed] the economic sphere from the realm of criticism” under critical theory (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 5). Though Fraser and Jaeggi find issue with the removal of economic critique in critical theory, they simultaneously find issue with the orthodox Marxist critique. They reject critiquing solely what is traditionally called the “economy” under capitalism, an approach they label as economism (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 8). In this way, they praise Habermas and his successors for providing the distance that allowed critical theorists to “explore a wide array of cultural issues, such as gender, race, sexuality, and identity … in a way that did not subordinate them to economics” (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 7). Fraser and Jaeggi aim to take the insights of both sides without limiting themselves to one sphere of critique—to create a “grand theory” of capitalist society (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 9).

To create this grand theory, Fraser and Jaeggi begin with establishing four orthodox core features of capitalism: the worker-capitalist class division stemming from the private ownership of the means of production; a “free” labor market; prioritization to the expansion of capital rather than satisfying needs; and an allocative market of productive inputs and social surplus (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 28). Although Marx did not conceptualize capitalism in exactly this way, these features are all very familiar as elements of his writings. Where Fraser and Jaeggi differ from Marx is by establishing these features as comprising capitalism's “economic foreground”, which is supported by a “non-economic background” (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 29). The background also consists of four features: the relationship between the core and the periphery, the distinction between human and non-human, the separation of social reproduction from commodity production, and the economy's division from the polity. These background features have been addressed by Marx to varying degrees, and Fraser and Jaeggi give him varying amounts of credit. I will investigate each background condition in further detail.

A foundational Marxist feminist concept is the lack of compensation for social reproduction. Reproduction is often narrowly defined as birthing and childcare, but Fraser defines it as “encompass[ing] the creation, socialization, and subjectivation of human beings more generally” (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 32). Because this work is often not within the market, reproductive laborers (disproportionately women) are not properly compensated for their labor, placing them “structurally subordinate” to productive laborers (disproportionately men), despite reproductive labor being necessary for the production of wealth (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 34). Mention of capital's appropriation of social reproduction is notably absent from Marx's critique of capitalism, but perhaps the closest thing to it is in his discussion of the means of subsistence. In Chapter 4 of Capital, Marx writes, “the cost of production of simple labor-power amounts to the cost of the existence and propagation of the worker” (Marx, Capital, ch. 4). The reproducer is being paid indirectly, but I imagine that Marx would argue that that pay is insufficient. In the same way that the worker being paid a subsistence wage does not properly compensate for the labor-power of production, the caretaker being paid a subsistence wage does not properly compensate for the labor-power of social reproduction. Although Marx does not explicitly state this conclusion, he does outline its logic in his grouping of production and reproduction under exploitation—and Fraser and Jaeggi do not give Marx any credit in this respect.

The distinction between the “human” and “non-human” (or “natural”) spheres is unique to capitalism, according to Fraser and Jaeggi. Fraser explains, “Structurally, capitalism assumes (indeed inaugurates) a sharp distinction between division between a natural realm, conceived as a free, unproduced supply of ‘raw materials,’ available for appropriation, and an economic realm, conceived as a sphere of value, produced by and for human beings” (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 36). As we have learned, the fashion in which capital has appropriated nature unilaterally has had horrible consequences for both “spheres”. In contemporary times, the epitome of the failings of this relation is climate change, stemming from the unhindered increase in CO2 levels by burning fossil fuels. By treating the environment as a separate sphere from humanity, we have forgotten the ways in which the two are connected, and the environment is now reminding us. Although Marx does not explicitly make note of a distinction between the human and non-human, he does note the consequences of the resultant type of appropriation. In Chapter 15 of Capital, Marx discusses how the growth of industry resulted in infertile soil:

Capitalist production, by collecting the population in great centers, and causing an ever-increasing preponderance of town population, on the one hand concentrates the historical motive power of society; on the other hand, it disturbs the circulation of matter between man and the soil, i.e., prevents the return to the soil of its elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; it therefore violates the conditions necessary to lasting fertility of the soil. (Marx, Capital, ch. 15)

This observation by Marx forms the basis of the concept of the “metabolic rift,” coined by John Bellamy Foster. This quote also demonstrates that, while they generally agree on the concepts, they differ in their framing: Fraser and Jaeggi frame environmental appropriation as a condition of capitalism, while Marx only frames environmental destruction as a consequence of capitalism.

Fraser and Jaeggi detail the polity's interactions with the economy making a remarkable shift under capitalism. Rather than economic power being centralized in the state and being one-in-the-same with political power, as they tended to be in previous economic systems, the two powers became institutionally separated. But in this rises a contradiction: the economy is simultaneously reliant on the state “for various forms of political and social organization without which it couldn't profitably produce and sell commodities, access and exploit labor, and accumulate and surplus value on a sustained and ongoing basis” (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 72). As a result, capital has to intervene in the activities of the state. It is apt to view capitalism as the economy (the interests of capital) governing society more than the other way around. Fraser and Jaeggi's conception reflects Marx's famous classification of the state as a “committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx, The Communist Manifesto, ch. 1). Their model is more comprehensive in that it qualifies and justifies more detailed interactions of the economy with society. However, their model is perhaps not comprehensive enough as it does not explain the inner workings of the state, which facilitate the other side of the economy-polity relationship. Absent a sufficient state theory perspective, Fraser and Jaeggi accept the state as what they themselves might term a “black box”.

Fraser and Jaeggi extend Marx's ideas of primitive accumulation by recognizing that expropriation, particularly of the periphery, continues into the present—because it is a necessary condition of capitalism. Fraser states, “primitive accumulation denotes the ‘blood-soaked’ process by which capital was initially stockpiled at the system’s beginnings. Expropriation, in contrast, designates an ongoing confiscatory process essential for sustaining accumulation in a crisis-prone system” (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 43). This is not unique to their analysis; for example, Maria Mies labels this social relationship “superexploitation” in her feminist analysis Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale (Mies, p. 48). Fraser and Jaeggi diverge from Mies and Marx by recognizing that this “more obfuscated realm” is a political phenomenon unique from exploitation, labeling it “expropriation” (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 40). Economically, expropriation differs from exploitation in that “[capital] simply seizes labor, persons, and land without paying for their costs of reproduction” (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 41). But Fraser and Jaeggi argue that one cannot understand how capital has the power to seize from the periphery without understanding that those in the periphery do not have political rights protecting them from expropriation in the same way that workers in the core do. To establish who will not be protected, capital exploits social divisions, creating a racialized periphery like it creates a gendered reproductive force. Fraser and Jaeggi successfully incorporate gender and race into their model, while Marx does not even touch these subjects.

Arguably, the greatest insight Fraser and Jaeggi bring to capitalism is their foundational effort to reconceptualize it outside the restraints of an “economic system”. As critical theorists, they are able to recognize that the economy is a social system, and as such, it will interact with various realms. Jaeggi states, “In a practice-oriented approach, the economy and its institutions comprise a subset of social practices that are interrelated with other practices in a variety of ways, which, taken together, form part of the socio-cultural fabric of society” (Fraser/Jaeggi, p. 8). One might even argue that Fraser and Jaeggi do not sufficiently emphasize how similar the background and foreground conditions of capitalism are. By examining these background conditions, we can see that even the foreground conditions enter noneconomic realms; for example, by examining the core-periphery relationship, we see that the “free” labor market is actually a set of political protections for workers in the core. Marx did recognize that society and economy were connected—there is a reason why he is known as a father of sociology—but his heart was in the factory, blinding him from a greater range of social relations beyond worker and capitalist. Marx's blindspots explain his conception of capitalism as a (largely two-stage) social class hierarchy. Fraser and Jaeggi fill these blindspots, creating a more holistic image of capitalism as “an institutionalized social order”.