EDWARD: To begin, I would like to investigate what we will be discussing as well as who we actually are.
ATHENIAN: What do you mean by that?
E: I mean that our identities aren't exactly as clear-cut as you might think. For starters, you aren't the same Athenian that I read about, and certainly not the same Athenian others have read. You're my interpretation of your thoughts and my inferences of your lifestyle, though I don't want the latter to be so important.
A: But what does this have to do with what we are discussing?
E: Well this means that you are, in part, me. I don't want to strawman you, but I may mistakenly, and for that, I'm sorry in advance.
A: But I am not a specified Athenian, so how can you misrepresent my position?
E: For one, your position is separate from your identity in many ways and can be misrepresented. I can also misrepresent your culture, because truthfully, I don't know too much about it.
A: Let us begin. How would you like to progress?
E: I think I want to begin by discussing age. You were an old man in your own time, to your admission. That doesn't even take into account the 2000-year gap between our times. A lot has changed in that period. For one, we now value the young and pure, rather than the old and experienced.
A: How disappointing. I had hoped the dynamic between the ages would become more just, not less.
E: But what is “just”? You've argued that justness is derived from the gods, but our beliefs in gods differ. You may argue, then, that there is a logical basis to justness. Is that true?
A: In part, I suppose. There is a correct and just lifestyle, and that is, as I've said prior, the path that brings happiness.
E: Let me come back to that. You argue that the virtues must be taught to children at a young age, which I don't necessarily disagree with. Could it be possible that your “just” is only an illusion, since, in your society, the young are not allowed to dissent?
A: You make some novel arguments, but let me correct you. In an ideal society, the young are not allowed to dissent to the true and proven virtues. Athens is not a perfect society, which I feel comfortable admitting to you.
E: But in deriving an ideal society and ideal laws, don't we need the ability to question to discover the true virtues? In my society, we accept a certain level of chaos to allow debate.
A: Does your society allow all opinions to be expressed?
E: There are certain exceptions that we both would agree are common sense.[1] I guess I am also discussing my society's virtues, not our reality. Most of us try to have a society with free speech, but it is not so simple. Discussions and disagreement arise, including with those that don't share this virtue.[2]
A: Isn't that the prime weakness of a society where its citizens can say whatever they want? Citizens will not only disagree on the methods to properly enact virtues, but on the virtues themselves?
E: This is the chaos I mentioned earlier. We accept that as a temporary state, before, theoretically, reasoning brings our society to full agreement of virtues. At that point, this weakness is no longer an issue.[3] Dissent is also less likely to arise due to citizens feeling free and non-oppressed.[4]
A: Back to the issue of age: shouldn't the experienced old direct these conversations, at the very least? These citizens are, if not most compelled to the laws of the gods, most experienced with various opinions and lifestyles in your ideal, fluid society?
E: Our hierarchies are viewed, not as logical truths or naturally correct, but as social constructions that bring us away from a fair, uncorrupted, logical society. The young, in this framework, are the least corrupted and closest to the truth. You admitted that you can convince children of just about anything,[5] why should we assume they will grow to align with the truth?
A: I am not inclined to ascribe to your conclusion. The young are naturally corrupted by desire and cheap pleasures, while the old are numb to these temptations due to their nature and experience.
E: I can concede that the young are corrupted, I guess. But are the old much better? In my society, we have social media: online platforms that are phenomenal at exploiting these human vulnerabilities. The young, including myself, have grown up with these technologies and so tend to be better at discerning truth from deception than the old, who are similar to young children in this respect.
A: Were you not guided by the old in learning these lessons?
E: I was, but I'm not challenging that aspect. I'm only arguing that every age has its own merits in conversation.
A: We should return to justness as what brings happiness. Why should one live a just life when an unjust life is more pleasurable?
E: Is that not why we struggle with unjust people, because of the pleasure that unjust lifestyles can bring?
A: The pleasure you speak of is cheap pleasure, like what we were discussing earlier. True pleasure, what you could call fulfillment, is brought by justice.
E: Perhaps, but isn't justness a collective thing? I live justly, not because it's pleasurable to me, but because it brings a better world that brings the most collective pleasure, at least when everyone lives that way.[6]
1. I leave this intentionally vague for two reasons. Firstly, I believe that the Athenian would extend much further than me in our ranges of censorship. But secondly, I am not so sure myself where to draw these lines. Speech or the expression of opinions that directly cause harm is one area that seems like common sense to censor. But even here, what do we classify as harm? Self-defense can cause harm, but this is a just harm to most. Are we limiting harm to physical harm? Do we consider economic harm or emotional harm, which can lead to physical harm under some circumstances? If we decided to censor the latter, no opinion would be allowed to be expressed. When originally writing, I was mainly thinking of the shouting fire in a crowded theater example. But although this is a type of speech, there is no opinion expressed in this example, so I decided not to mention it.
2. This raises the paradox of tolerance. I will later argue that the state should not censor intolerant positions, even though this creates chaos. I don't answer whether the state and society should have the same positions on the paradox of tolerance, but I imply that if the state takes a more liberal position than greater society, this chaos will be a temporary state.
3. If there is a discussion between two people who share the same virtues, the correct virtues, the conversation is moved to implementation of those virtues.
4. I don't justify this assertion, and on my second reading, it could certainly be argued that it's nonsensical. The assertion relies on a model of trust: you trust me, I act trustworthy. This model is already mostly true in our current society, except with a few unjust people. In this ideal society, where everyone is virtuous, they would align with this model.
5. 664a
6. This is not where my thoughts necessarily end, but it's where I ran out of time during the class period.