On April 24, 1980, President Jimmy Carter ordered the ultimately unsuccessful Operation Eagle Claw to rescue 50 American hostages in Iran. This investigation will assess the research question: to what extent did the failure of Operation Eagle Claw to rescue the American hostages in Iran result in Jimmy Carter’s defeat in the 1980 United States presidential election?
ABC News and The Harris Poll conducted a public opinion poll of 793 likely voters on April 25, 1980, published on May 1. Louis Harris, journalist and founder of The Harris Poll, wrote the analysis associated with the poll results. As the poll was conducted one day after the operation’s failure was announced, and another poll was conducted approximately one month prior, the origin of this source is valuable because it isolates the effect of the news of the failed operation on public opinion. However, one limitation of the origin is the possible exacerbation of the event’s significance on public sentiment by being in recent memories of participants; the operation’s effect could have been more moderate by the election.
The purpose of this poll is to understand the standing of the presidential race, as well as public opinion on the Iran Hostage Crisis. This purpose is valuable as it aims to isolate the changing status of the election within the timeframe where the operation relevant to this investigation would have arguably made its largest impact. With an analysis, Louis Harris places the poll results into context with the political events of the time, specifically Operation Eagle Claw’s failure. The content of this analysis is valuable as it provides other polls regarding Carter’s performance in Iran, though it is limited as the polls are not focused on the failed operation. The poll results are valuable as participants are separated on their opinion on Carter’s handling of the hostage crisis as well as ideological identification.
An analysis by Douglas Hibbs examined the effects of the supposed prior conservative shift and the 1980 economic crisis on the 1980 presidential election. The report was published in 1982, well into Reagan’s first term, meaning Hibbs provides analysis in hindsight: an origin which adds value by being removed from the events as they were occurring. However, this distance in time is also limiting as Hibbs had to rely on primary sources that were not specifically constructed for his analysis. Hibbs was a professor of government and economics at MIT and Harvard (Hibbs), making him qualified to speak on this topic and his analysis valuable.
The purpose of this document is to determine the extent that Ronald Reagan can claim a mandate for conservative policies from his 1980 election victory. This purpose acts as a limitation as Hibbs does not seek to examine Operation Eagle Claw or the Iran Hostage Crisis. Hibbs compares ideological shifts in the American populace and economic strength to electoral results. The content is valuable in determining the extent of the economy and conservatism on Carter’s loss, which are relevant to this investigation as confounding variables. The content is limiting to this investigation because Hibbs only considers “two ways to interpret the 1980 election outcomes” (388) unrelated to the operation.
This investigation will assess the extent to which the failure of Operation Eagle Claw in rescuing the American hostages in Iran resulted in Jimmy Carter's defeat in the 1980 United States presidential election. First, the political context and Carter's internal psychology prior to the operation will be examined. Next, public opinion polls and political rhetoric following the operation will be analyzed. Then, to further isolate the effect of Operation Eagle Claw, confounding variables — economic factors, a purported rise in conservatism, and the introduction of the independent candidate John B. Anderson — will be assessed.
To assess the extent of Operation Eagle Claw on Jimmy Carter's later defeat, and to understand the political context, a useful starting point is to learn the Carter administration's rationale for the operation. At the time of the operation, the American hostages at the Iranian Embassy had not been freed for nearly six months. While Americans grew impatient, Carter had adopted a diplomatic strategy. In a March poll, most Americans believed that Carter was "too soft" on Iran (TIME). However, there was less consensus among his advisors: Zbigniew Brzezinski, his National Security Advisor, believed military action was their only option, while Cyrus Vance, his Secretary of State, insisted the best option was to wait for political tensions to calm (Bowden). Additionally, Carter faced a primary challenge from progressive juggernaut Ted Kennedy. Although the challenge was likely to fail, Kennedy's upset victories in Connecticut and New York in late March had put the Carter campaign's strength into question.
President Carter's internal psychology likely influenced him to take a risk with Operation Eagle Claw. According to Carter in his April 25 announcement of the failure of the mission, he had concluded that "the Iranian authorities could not or would not resolve this crisis on their own initiative,” leaving him to view the military mission as a last resort (TIME). However, the psychological theory of prospect theory states that decision-makers tend to be riskier when trying to minimize potential losses (McDermott 238). The risk of a military operation such as Operation Eagle Claw, especially as it was uncharacteristic of his diplomacy-focused strategy, serves as evidence that Carter had already anticipated potential future losses to the United States or his own political future, due to the hostage crisis or otherwise.
Public opinion polls surrounding the event compromise a valuable resource in determining the immediate effects of Operation Eagle Claw on the electorate. In late March, Carter was tied with Reagan nationally, both sitting at 38% support. However, on April 25, in the immediate wake of the operation's failure, Carter's support fell to 33%, while Reagan's jumped to 42% (ABC News – Harris). Although the operation was not the only event within the one-month gap between polls, it's likely that a recent failure of a major US military operation would primarily drive this fall in Carter's polling numbers, especially as the failure of the operation was specifically noted as significant in the poll's analysis (ABC News – Harris). Operation Eagle Claw likely negatively impacted support for the Carter campaign, at least immediately.
It is useful to examine political rhetoric regarding the crisis, as although it may not be representative of public opinion, it reveals what was believed by other political minds to threaten Carter's campaign. On May 5, in wake of the operation, TIME wrote: “While most of Carter's political foes tactfully withheld criticism, his image as inept had been renewed”. To avoid disrespecting the soldiers who died in the mission, Carter's political opposition used dog whistles when describing the operation, especially with messages of ineptitude or disorganization. In the 1980 Republican Party Platform — which outlines both the party's principles and its talking points for the 1980 elections — Reagan criticized the “lack of close coordination” in Iran (Republican National Convention), possibly referring to the lack of military coordination that caused the operation's failure. On the other hand, at the second Presidential debate, when asked how he would combat instances of terrorism like the Iran Hostage Crisis, Reagan did not mention or reference the operation. Reagan instead called for a Congressional investigation into the longevity of the crisis, which he described as a “humiliation,” once the hostages were released. It appears unlikely that Reagan's rhetoric intended to focus on Operation Eagle Claw. It is more likely that the Reagan campaign did not feel the need to mention the operation due to the already substantial public disapproval of Carter's response in general.
To determine the relative importance of Operation Eagle Claw in the 1980 election, its impact needs to be compared to that of the economy. In his 1982 paper, Douglas Hibbs found a strong correlation between the growth of median disposable income and the incumbent's vote share in all post-war reelection years up to and including 1980 (Hibbs 395). Carter had the worst election-year economic record since Herbert Hoover; unemployment approached 8%, inflation was high, and median disposable income had decreased (Hibbs 406, Bureau of Labor). It is not surprising then that Carter was also the first elected president to be defeated during his reelection bid since Hoover. And voters clearly placed the economy above the Iran Hostage Crisis: 40% of Reagan voters listed “Inflation and the Economy” as a top 2 reason for their vote, compared to 9% listing “Crisis in Iran” (CBS News – New York Times). These economic challenges support the theory that Carter's loss in 1980 was simply part of a decades-long political trend.
Another factor worth considering when examining the relative role of Operation Eagle Claw is the supposed national rise in conservatism. In Robert Collins's book detailing Ronald Reagan's political impact, Collins describes conservatism in the late 1970s as “a movement with growing political clout and funding, serious ideas, and grass-roots energy and savvy” (Collins 47). However, it is debatable whether the electorate actually shifted enough by 1980 to make a significant difference to the election's outcome. In fact, in Hibbs's paper examining Reagan's mandate after his victory, he found that “there was no great ideological shift in 1980” (403) by studying the electorate's ideological makeup from studies by SRC, Gallup, and General Social Services. Instead, it is more likely that voters' economic desperation made them amenable to supporting a more conservative candidate. This economic factor is clear in Reagan's messaging, like in his infamous quote: “are you better off than you were 4 years ago?”. This messaging resonated; of Reagan voters' top two sentiments responsible for their vote, “It's time for a change” made up about 40%, while “[Reagan is] a strong leader” made up 20%, and “[Reagan is] a real conservative'' made up only 11% (CBS News – New York Times). Finally, opposition to Carter's handling of the crisis correlated more with support for Ronald Reagan than conservatism (ABC News – Harris), putting into question the narrative that Reagan's support was primarily drawn from conservatives. However, it is critical to note that the poll broke down likely voters by their opinions on the hostage crisis, not the operation specifically. There is no notable evidence that a rise in conservatism was a major factor in the 1980 election, likely making Operation Eagle Claw a more significant contributor to Carter's loss.
It is also important to note a unique element to the 1980 Presidential election: a prominent independent candidate, John B. Anderson. In March and April, his support reached about 20%, a massively impressive feat (ABC News – Harris). Carter's aides certainly feared Anderson, even saying that he was a greater threat to their campaign than Reagan (Walsh). Carter refused to appear in any debate with Anderson present, as to avoid legitimizing Anderson's campaign. However, Anderson's support eventually faded and he won only 6.6% of the total popular vote, less than the 9.7% margin between Reagan and Carter. However, if all of the votes for Anderson were cast for Carter, Carter would have received 207 electoral votes as opposed to the 49 he actually received (American Presidency Project). Though it is a sizable increase, this change does not provide Carter the 270 electoral votes needed to become President. Not to mention this relies on the presumption that Anderson was a spoiler candidate only for Carter, which is incorrect: in October 1980, 44% of Anderson voters listed Carter as their second choice, but 32% of Anderson voters listed Reagan (ABC News – Harris). It is reasonable to conclude that Anderson's candidacy had only minor effects on Carter's support in the 1980 election.
The failure of Operation Eagle Claw affected the 1980 election to a limited extent, but not as much as Carter's economic failures. The operation certainly affected polls immediately, but it was overshadowed by Carter's handling of the greater Iran Hostage Crisis. But more importantly, the poor economic performance leading up to the 1980 election was blamed on Carter at the ballot box. As James Carville famously said while helping unseat George H.W. Bush, the other one-term President of the late 20th century, “It's the economy, stupid” (Hegedus and Pennebaker).
In my search to determine the extent to which Operation Eagle Claw affected Jimmy Carter's defeat in the 1980 election, I quickly came to understand that I couldn't examine the operation in isolation. Like a scientist or mathematician, a historian needs to eliminate confounding variables to determine causality. However, the retelling of history will inevitably contain bias in reporting the significance of factors, as well as what factors are mentioned at all. I was forced to rely on secondary sources, like Hibb's “President Reagan's Mandate From The 1980 Elections”, to select the significant factors out of the countless possibilities. When evaluating the three additional factors I chose — the economy, independent candidate John B. Anderson, and the rise of conservatism — I attempted to stick with primary sources like opinion polls.
The analysis of contemporaneous political rhetoric, particularly of Carter's opposition, was particularly difficult. An abundance of commentary regarding the Iran Hostage Crisis could be identified, but they generally centered around themes, like the “lack of close coordination” of Carter's response (Republican National Convention), rather than specific details or events, like the failure of Operation Eagle Claw. A balance had to be struck between labeling possible underlying messages and iterating the straightforward rhetoric. My work reflects how historians must allow for a certain amount of discretion in their analyses without distorting the facts. This differs from the work of the sciences, where conclusions can be drawn largely from indisputable observations and without subjective input.